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THE EU’S SINGLE RESOLUTION BOARD: AN EU AGENCY 
BUILT ON SAND OR ON A ROCK?
Ana Kozina, Stefan Martinić, Vedrana Mihalić*
Summary: The main topic of this paper is the validity of the establish-
ment of an EU agency, the Single Resolution Board, ie whether it was 
created on a valid legal basis in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
More broadly, but also on a smaller scale, the topic of the paper is also 
whether the creation of an EU agency, such as the SRB, is a prime 
example of transition from a system of EU vertical federalism to a sys-
tem of EU horizontal federalism and whether that transition is in ac-
cordance with the constitutional framework of the EU. The paper will 
also give an explanation of the three stages of the European Banking 
Union, the term ‘resolution’, and a brief overview of the SRB.
1 Introduction: the research problem, its background and the 
structure of the paper
‘Everyone therefore who hears these words of mine, and does them, I 
will liken him to a wise man, who built his house on a rock. The rain came 
down, the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat on that house; and 
it didn’t fall, for it was founded on the rock. Everyone who hears these 
words of mine, and doesn’t do them will be like a foolish man, who built 
his house on the sand. The rain came down, the floods came, and the 
winds blew, and beat on that house; and it fell - and great was its fall.’1
This paragraph from the Gospel of Matthew is about wise and foolish 
builders. This paper will, in essence, analyse whether the EU acted as a 
wise builder when it built the Single Resolution Board (hereinafter: ‘SRB’ 
or ‘the Board’).
The builders of the principal building of the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg, France, the Louise Weiss building, intended it to carry heavy 
*  The authors are fifth-year students at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb. We 
would like to express our gratitude to our mentor Jean Monnet Professor Tamara Ćapeta 
for her support, guidance and help through the preparation of this paper. Without her help, 
this paper would not have been possible. We would also like to thank the entire Chair of 
European Public Law at the University of Zagreb for their creative ideas, suggestions for 
various sources of information during the European Law Moot Court Competition on the 
topic of the European Banking Union which inspired us to write this paper, and for allowing 
us to borrow a large amount of literature. 
1 Matthew 7:24–27, Revised Standard Version of the Bible.
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symbolism.2 Its voluntarily unfinished aspect of the tower symbolises the 
unfinished work of European integration.3 It paints the European Union 
as work in progress.
The fact that the European Union is an unfinished project was evi-
dent during the banking, financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis 
that struck in 2008.4 When the crisis hit, every Member State (hereinaf-
ter: MS) tried to solve the ongoing crisis on its own.5 Such an individual 
approach by each MS created a phenomenon that is, basically, a never-
ending circle, making the solvency of an MS connected with the solvency 
of banks, causing the MSs to be vulnerable to the spill-over effect from 
their banking sectors.6 
As a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis, in 2012 the EU cre-
ated the European Banking Union (hereinafter: EBU).7 The EBU provides 
2 André M Winter, [photograph of Louise Weiss Building, Seat of the European Parliament 
in Strasbourg] (Cartographers on the Net, 10 August 2008) <www.carto.net/andre.mw/
photos/2008/10/08_strasbourg/20081008-143946_louise_weiss_building_seat_of_the_
european_parliament_in_strasbourg.shtml> accessed 10 February 2017.
3 Winter (n 2).
4 To find out more on the banking, financial and economic crisis in 2008, see also, ‘The 
Origin of the Financial Crisis; Crash Course’ The Economist (London, 7 September 2013) 
<www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-
being-felt-five-years-article> accessed 10 March 2017; Frederic S Mishkin, ‘Over the Cliff: 
From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis’ (2011) 25(1) Journal of Economic Per-
spectives <www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.25.1.49> accessed 10 March 2017; 




5 Aitor Erce ‘Bank and Sovereign Risk Feedback Loops’ (2015) Globalization and Monetary 
Policy Institute Working Paper 227 <www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpa-
pers/2015/0127.pdf> accessed 15 March 2017.
6 The financial and economic crisis started in 2008 with the failure of the largest banks 
in Iceland, and from there the sovereign debt crisis spread to the MSs of the EU, namely 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal in 2009 and Italy in 2010. In 2009, Greece announced that it 
had been understating its deficit figures for years, which consequently led to shutting Greece 
out from borrowing in the financial markets. In 2010 Greece was heading for bankruptcy 
and the EU discovered that the Greek government had effectively hidden its actual level of 
borrowing to be able to spend beyond its means and appear to maintain the required criteria 
to remain in the Eurozone. It soon became clear that the Greek government could not resolve 
the crisis on its own, especially since its credit rating in spring 2010 fell to junk level. It was 
impossible for the Greek government to bailout its banking system without aid. The concern 
spread from Greece to other highly indebted countries, given that the Maastricht criteria set 
out that an MS in the Eurozone should have a budget deficit below 3%; in 2010, it was 13% 
in Greece, 11.4% in Spain, and in Portugal 9.3%. For more on the Eurozone MS economic 
crisis, see Franco Praussello, ‘How Eurozone Member Countries Did Not Succeed in Fixing 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis’ in Franco Praussello (ed), The Eurozone Experience: Monetary In-
tegration in the Absence of a European Government (FrancoAngeli 2012) 15.
7 Douglas Elliot, ‘Key Issues on European Banking Union; Trade-Offs and Some Rec-
ommendations’ (2012) Brookings Institute Global Economy and Development 11/2012 52 
<www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11-european-banking-union-elliott.
pdf> accessed 26 March 2017.
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a strong and centralised system of supervision and resolution8 that has 
both the authority and the power to restore the stability of the Eurozone’s 
banking system and break the vicious circle between sovereign states and 
banks.9 Its aim is to put an end to the era of massive bailouts10 paid for 
by taxpayers and to help restore financial stability.11 Moreover, the objec-
tive of the EBU is to create the right conditions for the financial sector to 
lend to the real economy, spurring economic recovery and job creation.12 
A crucial institution within the EBU and the main focus of this paper 
is the independent EU Agency called the Single Resolution Board (‘SRB’ 
or ‘the Board’). The SRB was established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 
on the Single Resolution Mechanism (hereinafter: SRM Regulation).13 The 
SRM Regulation implements the EU-wide Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (hereinafter: BRRD) in the euro area.14 The SRM Regulation was 
8 According to the Council Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a frame-
work for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amend-
ing Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/
EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regu-
lations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council [2014] OJ L173 190 (hereinafter: BRRD), a resolution is a procedure, an alterna-
tive to bankruptcy proceedings, inured to ensure that the liquidation of banks is orderly, 
through a competent authority. See also European Commission Memo (European Commis-
sion, 15 April 2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-297_en.htm> ac-
cessed 9 March 2017. 
9 Upon creating the EBU with its supervisory and resolution powers, only the Eurozone MSs 
would automatically be under its governance, whilst other EU MSs that are not part of the Eu-
rozone can opt to enter. See also Eilís Ferran, ‘European Banking Union: Imperfect, But It Can 
Work’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), European Banking Union (OUP 2015) 80.
10 A bailout is a situation in which a business, an individual or a government offers money to 
a failing business to prevent the consequences that arise from the business’s downfall. Bail-
outs have traditionally occurred in industries or businesses that are perceived as no longer 
being viable or are sustaining huge losses. See also ‘Bailout’ Investopedia, <www.investope-
dia.com/terms/b/bailout.asp> accessed 13 April 2017; for example, in spring 2010, when it 
became evident that the Greek government would not be able to bailout its failing system, it 
called in the so-called troika - the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank 
and the European Commission. The troika issued the first of two international bailouts for 
Greece, which would eventually total more than €240 billion. The bailouts came with condi-
tions, such as deep budget cuts and steep tax increases. See also Praussello (n 6) 20.
11 Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir, Nicolas Véron and Guntram Wolff, ‘What Kind of Euro-
pean Banking Union?’ (2012) 12 Bruegel Policy Contribution <http://bruegel.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/imported/publications/pc_2012_12_Banking.pdf> accessed 5 April 2017.
12 Fritz Breuss, ‘European Banking Union’ (2013) WIFO Working Papers 336/2013, 454 
<http://fritz.breuss.wifo.ac.at/Breuss_European_Banking_Union_WIFO_WP_454_
Sept_2013.pdf> accessed 20 February 2017.
13 Council Regulation (EU) 806/2014 of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a 
uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in 
the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L225/1.
14 BRRD (n 8). For more on the BRRD, see European Commission, ʽSingle Resolution 
Mechanism to Come into Effect for the Banking Unionʼ (Press Release) IP/15/6397 <http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6397_en.htm> accessed 15 March 2017.
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adopted on the basis of article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter: TFEU).15
The SRB strives to become a trusted and respected resolution au-
thority with a strong resolution capacity and the ability to act swiftly and 
in an appropriate, consistent and proportionate manner in establishing 
and enforcing an effective resolution regime for ailing banks in the Single 
Resolution Mechanism jurisdictions, thus avoiding future taxpayer bail-
outs.16
The role of the Board is proactive: it focuses on resolution planning 
and preparation with a forward-looking mindset to avoid the potential 
negative impact of a bank failure on the real economy, financial stability 
and the public finances of the participating MSs17 of the EBU.18
But, unfortunately, the June 2017 the cases of Italian banks Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, as well as Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena which is being saved through a publicly funded ‘precautionary re-
capitalisation’, sends a clear signal that public coffers are still fair game 
for aiding failing banks.19
Even though at first glance it may seem that the Board has been 
created in the EU citizens’ best interests, we need to keep in mind the 
old saying that sometimes the road to hell is paved with good intentions. 
It may not signify that anything is worrisome in this particular case, but 
the authors would like to analyse the debate surrounding the Board and 
present their conclusions and arguments on the matter.
The main topic of this paper is the validity of the establishment and 
the empowerment of the SRB, ie whether it was created on a valid legal 
basis in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon. More broadly, but also on 
a smaller scale, the topic of the paper is whether the creation of an EU 
agency (the SRB) is a prime example of transition from a system of EU 
vertical federalism to a system of EU horizontal federalism20 and whether 
15 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C202.
16 Single Resolution Board Mission (Single Resolution Board) <https://srb.europa.eu/en/
mission> accessed 14 March 2017.
17 Upon creating the EBU with its supervisory and resolution powers, only the Eurozone 
MSs would automatically be under its governance, whilst other EU MSs that are not part of 
the Eurozone can opt to enter.  For more on MS participation, see Giuseppe Boccuzzi, The 
European Banking Unit: Supervision and Resolution (Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking 
and Financial Institutions 2016).
18 Single Resolution Board Mission <https://srb.europa.eu/en/mission> accessed 14 
March 2017.
19 For more on Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, see Fiona Maxwell, ʽItaly 
Tests EU’s New Rules, Again’ (Politico, 26 June 2017) <http://www.politico.eu/article/italy-
tests-eu-new-bank-rules-veneto-banca-popolare-di-vicenza/> accessed 1 August 2017.
20 The structure of EU federalism combines vertical federalism, ie vertical allocation/distri-
bution of power (between EU institutions and Member States) with horizontal federalism, ie 
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that transition is in accordance with the constitutional framework of the 
EU. Before specifying the main question of the paper, more context to the 
topic will be provided.
The EU is (or was until the EU agencies started to develop) a sys-
tem of so-called vertical federalism.21 This means that even though the 
EU has wide regulatory powers, the implementation and enforcement of 
those powers happens at the level of MSs.22 In a way, the EU level of gov-
ernance is not self-sufficient. It may not function without the cooperation 
of bodies in the MSs. In contrast, in the US or Canada, for example, there 
is a system of horizontal federalism.23 This means that each federal piece 
of legislation can be implemented and enforced by the agency established 
also at the federal level.24 Thus, the federal level is self-sufficient and the 
implementation of federal policies does not depend on MS willingness to 
enforce them (in the US, this is even prohibited; the federation cannot or-
der the states to implement federal law, so-called ‘no commandeering’).25
In the EU, vertical federalism is provided for in the Treaties, where 
article 291 TFEU provides that implementation happens in the MS. Only if 
necessary for the sake of uniformity may the Commission enact common 
implementing rules. However, with the establishment of regulatory agen-
cies this changes, and the EU also becomes independent of MS authorities. 
Article 114 TFEU, on which the SRB was established, can be invoked 
to establish an EU agency under the condition that the creation of such 
an EU agency will improve the functioning of the internal market.26 On 
horizontal allocation/distribution of power (between institutions at the EU level). In other 
words, it combines federalism with its own brand of separation of powers.
Vertical federalism is how power is or should be allocated between the federal and state tiers 
of government, and how to prevent the federal and state governments from encroaching on 
each other’s prerogatives. 
For more on the structure on EU federalism, see R Daniel Kelemen, ʽThe Structure and 
Dynamics of EU Federalism’ (2003) 36 Comparative Political Studies 184 <http://fas-polisci.
rutgers.edu/dkelemen/research/Kelemen_StructureAndDynamicsOfEUFederalism.pdf> 
accessed 17 March 2017; Allan Erbsen, ʽHorizontal Federalism’ (2008) 93 Minnesota Law 
Review 493 <http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&con
text=caselrev> accessed 18 March 2017. EU horizontal federalism is a horizontal allocation/
distribution of power between different institutions, bodies and agencies at the EU level. See 
Kelemen (n 20) 184-271.
21 Gregory A Caldeira, ʽComparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciaryʼ in Keith E 
Whittington, R Daniel Kelemen (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2010). 
22 ibid 1-14.
23 ibid 1-14.
24 Jeffrey N Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe, ‘Bank Resolution in the European Banking 
Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take’ (2015) 115 Columbia Law Re-
view 1297.
25 Gordon and Ringe (n 24).
26 Case C 217/04 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parlia-
ment and Council of the European Union (ENISA) ECLI:EU:C:2006:279, para 42.
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the basis of article 114 TFEU, the SRB was given the power to arrange 
the resolution of certain ailing banks, a right that was up to now reserved 
for MSs and their National Resolution Authorities (hereinafter: NRAs).27
The creation of the SRB with such power is, in fact, an act of taking 
away implementing powers from the MSs, even though the implementing 
powers are reserved by the Treaty of Lisbon for the MSs, except in ex-
ceptional circumstances.28 Such a transfer of implementing powers was 
justified by invoking the gains for the internal market.
Therefore, having in mind the principle of conferral of powers,29 upon 
which the Union is based, the question is whether article 114 TFEU is a 
valid legal basis for the establishment of such an EU agency, and wheth-
er this is an example of transition from the system of EU vertical federal-
ism to a system of EU horizontal federalism (under the pretext of internal 
market benefits). 
The transfer of implementing powers from the national level to the 
EU level represents an example of transition from the system of EU verti-
cal federalism to a system of EU horizontal federalism because there is 
a transition from a separation of different implementing powers between 
EU institutions and Member States (vertical federalism) to a separation of 
implementing powers between different institutions, bodies and agencies 
at the EU level (horizontal federalism).30
This argumentation and the relevance of the notion of federalism 
becomes clearer when one keeps in mind the relation between vertical 
27 Resolution authorities are the authorities in each Member State that are empowered to 
apply the resolution tools and exercise the resolution powers. In addition to the resolution 
authorities, competent ministries are also designated in the Member States, which are re-
sponsible for economic, financial and budgetary decisions at the national level according to 
national competences and which have been designated in each Member State as ministries 
responsible for exercising the functions of the competent ministries. Resolution authorities 
empowered to exercise resolution powers and apply the resolution tools are the Croatian 
National Bank, the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency and the State Agency 
for Deposit Insurance and Bank Resolution. See, also, Resolution Authorities (Hrvatska 
Narodna Banka 2016)
<https://www.hnb.hr/en/core-functions/resolution/resolution-authorities> accessed 20 
March 2017.
28 TFEU (n 15) art 291.
29 Under this fundamental principle of EU law, laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty on 
European Union, the EU acts only within the limits of the competences that EU countries 
have conferred upon it in the Treaties. These competences are defined in Articles 2–6 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. Competences not conferred on the EU by the Treaties 
thus remain with EU countries. While the principle of conferral governs the limits to EU 
competences, the use of those competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. See Conferral (EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law) 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/conferral.html> accessed 13 April 2017.
30 For more on EU vertical and horizontal federalism, see Kelemen (n 20) 184-271.
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and horizontal federalism on the one hand and the principle of confer-
ral and the principle of institutional balance31 on the other hand. These 
concepts are interlinked and have equivalent importance in an analysis 
of the architecture of the EU’s institutions and their pertaining powers. 
However, there is a relevant difference in the sense that the concept of 
vertical and horizontal federalism is used primarily to describe the alloca-
tion/distribution of power (between EU institutions and the MSs), while 
the concepts of the principle of conferral and the principle of institutional 
balance are primarily used to govern the limits to competences between 
different EU institutions and MSs. In other words, the latter concepts 
are actually used as a justification based in the Treaty for the attribution 
of certain powers to a certain EU institution, or juxtaposed as a test of 
whether the legality of the attribution of a power to an institution would 
come into question. The former concept of different types of federalism, 
on the other hand, is used simply to factually explain the different alloca-
tion of competences, ie power, in different systems of government.
The Treaty of Lisbon, in its article 114(1), envisaged the possibility 
of the adoption ‘of measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market’.32 The logic could be illustrated as follows: if the establishment of 
the SRB fulfils the conditions laid down in article 114 TFEU, then there 
cannot be claims of an infraction of the principle of conferral or of an 
unconstitutional breach of the principle of institutional balance. Only if 
the conditions of article 114 TFEU are not satisfied can there be a deeper 
investigation and discussion of whether the principles of conferral and/
or the principle of institutional balance have been under assault. This is 
because the MSs, by ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon, have accepted the pos-
sibility that article 114 TFEU will be used for the adoption of measures if 
its conditions are met; thus, EU countries cannot claim that the EU acts 
outside its competences since they conferred this competence upon it in 
31 The principle of institutional balance in the EU implies that each of its institutions has 
to act in accordance with the powers conferred on it by the Treaties, in accordance with 
the division of powers. The principle derives from a 1958 judgment by the Court of Justice 
(the Meroni judgment) and prohibits any encroachment by one institution on the powers 
of another. It is the responsibility of the Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure 
that this principle is respected. Put at its simplest, for example, this refers to the relation-
ship between the three main EU institutions: the European Parliament, the Council of the 
European Union and the European Commission. The dynamics between these bodies have 
evolved considerably over the years with the adoption of new treaties. The competences of 
the European Parliament, in particular, have expanded, giving it the right of co-decision 
with the Council (under the ordinary legislative procedure) in the majority of EU policy ar-
eas, as well as wider budgetary powers. See EUR-lex Institutional Balance
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/institutional_balance.html> accessed 20 
April 2017.
32 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2016] OJ C202. 
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the first place.
Therefore, examination will be made on whether or not the EU insti-
tutions are changing EU federalism as envisaged by the Treaty of Lisbon 
because of the needs of the moment and against the provisions of TFEU 
and the fundamental principle of conferral. If so, how can this be seen as 
constitutional?
While discussing the constitutionality of the alleged changing of EU 
federalism, the debate will be limited to the situation surrounding the 
SRB, as a complete analysis of (the transition of) EU federalism goes be-
yond the scope of this paper.
There is no denying that there is an economic, financial and political 
need for the on-going construction of the European project.33 However, 
the development of the EU’s agencies and its administrative landscape, 
as well as transition from a system of EU vertical federalism to EU hori-
zontal federalism, needs to withstand the scrutiny of the rule of law. 
Any development of the European project that would be based con-
trary to the ratified Treaty of Lisbon would be built on sand, as it would 
only embolden the growing Eurosceptic sentiment throughout the Con-
tinent. Such a cautious stance is not a novel idea, since there have been 
many articles and discussions on whether judicial activism can be a ve-
hicle of democratic deficit and Euroscepticism.34 
There is concern over the sound legal basis for adopting the SRM 
Regulation (an important foundation for the EBU, which also established 
the SRB) expressed, for example, by the German Minister of Finance 
(since 2009) Wolfgang Schäuble.35 A letter from Germany’s chief banking 
union negotiator, Mr. Schäuble, to the then EU Commissioner for Inter-
nal Market and Services, Michel Barnier, written on 11 July 2013, re-
veals significant scepticism over the appropriateness of article 114 TFEU 
as a sound legal foundation of the EBU and SRB.36
Unfortunately, the SRB is not the only EU agency concerning which 
there is scepticism over its legal foundations. In May 2012, the United 
33 In June 2015, the Five Presidents issued a report on the state of the EBU, emphasising 
the need for its completion on the way to achieving the singular monetary policy and its 
implementation and execution in the Eurozone MSs. See The Five Presidents’ Report, ‘Com-
pleting Europe’s Economic and Monetary Unionʼ (European Commission, 22 June 2015) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/factsheet-completing-banking-union-21102015_
en.pdf>  accessed 17 April 2017.
34 See, for instance, JHH Weiler, The Political and Legal Culture of European Integration: 
An Exploratory Essay (2011) 9(3-4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 678.
35 Klaus C Engelen, ʽQuestionable Legalityʼ (2014) The Magazine of International Economic 
Policy 38 <http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Su14_Engelen.pdf> accessed 17 
April 2017.
36 Letter from Wolfgang Schäuble to Michel Barnier (11 July 2013).
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Kingdom brought an action before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereinafter: the Court) seeking the annulment of article 28 of Reg-
ulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default 
swaps (OJ 2012 L86/1) (hereinafter: Short Selling Regulation).37 The Unit-
ed Kingdom submitted that article 114 TFEU was not the correct legal ba-
sis for the adoption of the rules laid down in article 28 of the Regulation.38 
The United Kingdom also contended, inter alia, that an EU agency, the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (hereinafter: ESMA) had been 
given a very large measure of discretion of a political nature which was at 
odds with EU principles relating to the delegation of powers.39 
Although Advocate General (hereinafter: AG) Niilo Jääskinen pro-
posed that article 28 of the Regulation be annulled on the grounds that 
article 114 TFEU was not a proper legal basis for its adoption,40 the Court 
took a different view.41 The Court took a view in favour of the EU agency, 
ie ESMA, and such a position of the Court is regarded as a controversial 
one in academia (see more on the ESMA case in subsection 3.2 below).42
Hence, because of the debate and the differing opinions in academia, 
in the European institutions,43 in national governments,44 etc, the authors 
believe that there is controversy and open questions about the limits 
of article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the creation of the SRB and 
37 Case C 270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parlia-
ment and Council of the European Union (ESMA) ECLI:EU:C:2014:18. 
38 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps OJ [2012] L 86/1, 
paras 88-90 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:086:00
01:0024:en:PDF> accessed 24 March 2017.
39 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (n 38) paras 28–34.
40 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parlia-
ment and Council of the European Union [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2013:562, Opinion of AG Jääski-
nen <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=140965&doclang=EN> 
accessed 13 April 2017.
41 ESMA (n 34) para 119.
42 See also, Phedon Nicolaides and Nadir Preziosi, ʽDiscretion and Accountability: The 
ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrineʼ (2014) Bruges European Economic Research 
Papers 30/2014 <http://aei.pitt.edu/57214/> accessed 14 April 2017; Simone Gabbi, ʽThe 
Principle of Institutional (Un)Balance after Lisbonʼ (2014) 5(2) European Journal of Risk 
Regulation 259; Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, 
OUP 2014); Marta Simoncini, ʽLegal Boundaries of European Supervisory Authorities in 
the Financial Markets: Tensions in the Development of True Regulatory Agenciesʼ (2015) 34 
YEL 319.
43 Alex Barker, ‘Setback for Brussels as Lawyers Warn on Banking Union Plans’ Financial 
Times (London, 2013) <https://www.ft.com/content/306c4e48-2ffe-11e3-9eec-00144fe-
ab7de> accessed 3 February 2017.
44 For more on national governments’ debate on the scope of art 114 TFEU, see Alex Bark-
er, ‘Blow to German Banking Union Plan’ Financial Times (London, 2013) <https://www.
ft.com/content/ea7c2eb6-1b90-11e3-94a3-00144feab7de> accessed 3 February 2017.
224 Ana Kozina, Stefan Martinić, Vedrana Mihalić: The EU’s Single Resolution Board
similar current and future EU agencies, as well as for the ongoing ‘agen-
cification’45 of the EU, or what other authors vividly call the ‘mushroom-
ing of EU agencies’.46 The authors would like to emphasise that some 
doctrines have considered the SRB to be built on sand. However, from 
this standpoint it is important not to take the surrounding controversy 
at face value, but to dissect it, elaborate a potential different approach 
and to conclude whether or not the criticism of the founding of such an 
important EU agency is persuasive.
Therefore, this paper will analyse two main questions:
1. Was Article 114 TFEU a valid legal basis for the adoption of 
the SRM Regulation by which the EU agency ‘Single Resolution 
Board’ was established?
2. In a broader perspective, but also on a smaller scale, is this an 
example of transition from a system of EU vertical federalism to a 
system of EU horizontal federalism, and is it in accordance with 
the constitutional framework of the EU?
In section 2 below, an explanation will be given of the three stages 
of the EBU, the term ‘resolution’ and a brief overview of the SRB in order 
to allow readers to understand the key features and logic behind their 
establishment.
In section 3, a general overview of the EU agencies will be given at 
the outset, and then an analysis will be made of (i) the appropriateness 
of using article 114 TFEU to centralise a resolution mechanism; (ii) the 
appropriateness of setting up an agency with centralised implementing 
powers on the basis of article 114 TFEU; and (iii) in general terms, wheth-
er the EU principle of conferral has been breached.
45 ‘Agencification refers to the creation of semi-autonomous organizations that operate at 
arms’ length of the government, to carry out public tasks (regulation, service delivery, policy 
implementation) in a relatively autonomous way ie there is less hierarchical and political in-
fluence on their daily operations, and they have more managerial freedoms. There is much 
controversy over the definition of agencies but a consensus has grown that an “agency” 
in terms of agencification is an organization that (i) is structurally disaggregated from the 
government and (ii) operates under more business-like conditions than the government 
bureaucracy. Agencies can for example have a different financial system and personnel 
policies, although the degrees of financial, personnel, and management autonomy vary per 
(type of) organization. It is exactly this degree of variation between (types of) organizations 
that make it impossible to develop a more precise definition.’ See Herwig CH Hofmann and 
Alessandro Morini, ʽ Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive Through 
“Agencification”ʼ (2012) 37(4) European Law Review 419.
46 See Madalina Busuioc, ‘Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of Euro-
pean Agencies’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 600; Anne Meuwese, Ymre Schuurmans 
and Wim Voermans, ‘Towards a European Administrative Procedure Act?’ (2009) Review of 
European Administrative Law 16.
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Lastly, section 4 will draw conclusions and answer the main ques-
tions of the paper.
2 The Single Resolution Board: the why and the how behind it 
In order for readers to understand the discussions in this paper, this 
section will give a brief explanation of the three stages of the European 
Banking Union, the term ‘resolution’ and the SRB and its powers.
2.1 Three stages of the European Banking Union (EBU) 
As mentioned above, the idea of the EBU came about as a conse-
quence of the sovereign debt crisis. The heads of state and government 
had in June 2012 agreed upon creating a banking union, a new frame-
work and a means of completing the monetary and economic union.47 The 
original plan was to create a thriving economic, monetary and banking 
union whose foundations would stand on four pillars built in the follow-
ing three stages:48
- Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM);
- Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM);
- European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS).49
These three stages are all interconnected and are overlaid by the 
Single Rulebook that sets up the framework and is the legal basis of the 
EBU.50
In the first stage, there was a transfer of the responsibility of banking 
supervision from the national authorities to the ECB as the centre from 
47 ‘A single banking system is the mirror image of a single money. As the vast majority of 
money is bank deposits, money can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank 
deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. This re-
quires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit insurance.’ See 
The Five Presidents’ Report (n 33).
48 The four pillars upon which the EBU should be built are: an integrated financial frame-
work, an integrated budgetary framework, an integrated economic policy framework to en-
sure growth, employment and competitiveness, and ensuring democratic legitimacy and 
accountability in decision-making in the EMU, whilst the three stages in which to do it are: 
a single supervisory mechanism, a single resolution mechanism and a single deposit guar-
antee mechanism. See also Breuss (n 12) 454.
49 Erik Berglöf, Ralph De Haas and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ʽBanking Union: The View from 
Emerging Europeʼ (2012) VOX CEPR’s Policy Portal <http://voxeu.org/article/banking-
union-view-emerging-europe> accessed 15 April 2017.
50 Council Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for 
credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2012] 
OJ L176/1 (CRR Regulation); Council Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC 
and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L176/338 (hereinafter: CRD IV Directive).
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which the EBU started its formation.51 The Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism (hereinafter: SSM) was set up and became fully operational in No-
vember 2014 when the ECB achieved its supervisory tasks.52
The second stage includes: a new set of rules governing the resolu-
tion of troubled banks, as laid down in the BRRD; a new authority – the 
Single Resolution Board which holds resolution powers; and the Single 
Resolution Fund (hereinafter: SRF) which is entrusted with financial re-
sources pooled together across the euro area countries.53 The new rules 
and the Board have been running since January 2016, without the SRF, 
which is going to be built gradually during a transition period that will 
end in 2024.54
The third stage is currently missing, since the Directive on Deposit 
Insurance approved in 2014 is still a harmonisation device, and it does 
not introduce any common guarantee scheme across the Eurozone MSs.55
To sum up, the then newly formed banking union was to develop 
through three stages. The first stage involves the establishment of the 
SSM to provide supervision for the entire Eurozone.56 The second stage 
is the establishment of the SRM with the SRB that decides whether a 
financial institution under supervision came to the point where it needs 
to be resolved.57 And the third stage is the establishment of the EDIS that 
provides a safety net for the financial institutions undergoing restructur-
ing and resolution.58
51 Berglöf, De Haas and Zettelmeyer (n 49).
52 Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions [2013] OJ L287/63 (hereinafter: SSM Regulation). Related changes were made 
when the ECB achieved its supervisory tasks through the Memorandum of Understand-
ing between the Council and the ECB on practical aspects of the exercise of democratic 
accountability of the supervisory tasks of the ECB vis-à-vis the Council (December 2013); 
the Inter-institutional Agreement covering practical aspects of the exercise of democratic 
accountability of the supervisory tasks of the ECB vis-à-vis the European Parliament (No-
vember 2013); Regulation EU 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 
establishing the framework for cooperation within the single Supervisory Mechanism be-
tween the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national 
designated authorities [2014] OJ L141/1 (hereinafter: SSM Framework Regulation); Regu-
lation (EU) 469/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 amending Regula-
tion (EC) 2157/1999 on the powers of the European Central Bank to impose sanctions 
(ECB/1999/4) [2014] OJ L141/51.
53 SSM Regulation (n 52).
54 SSM Framework Regulation (n 52).
55 Angelo Baglioni, The European Banking Union: A Critical Assessment (Palgrave Macmil-
lan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions 2016). 
56 Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘European Deposit Insurance and Resolution in the 
Banking Unionʼ (2014) 52(3) Journal of Common Market Studies 529 <http://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/jcms.12124/full> accessed 14 April 2017.
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
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2.2 The resolution of ailing banks
As already stated, the SRB is an EU agency in charge of handling 
bank and other financial institution resolutions. ‘Resolution’ is the main 
right, duty and preoccupation of the SRB. Hence, before one defines the 
SRB and its powers, one needs to define the term ‘resolution’.
According to the BRRD,59 a resolution is a procedure, an alternative 
to bankruptcy proceedings,60 implemented to ensure that the liquidation 
of banks is orderly, through a competent authority.61 Its aim is to prevent 
the failure of a given bank from evolving into a systemic banking crisis 
and to minimise the cost to taxpayers for supporting banks.62 Resolution 
occurs at the point when the authorities determine that a bank is failing 
or likely to fail, when no other private sector intervention could bring the 
institution back to viability within a set timeframe and when the usual 
insolvency proceedings63 would lead to financial instability.64
Resolution is an essential complement to other EBU tools designed to 
make the financial system sounder, eg making banks stronger by requiring 
higher levels of sounder quality capital, a higher level of depositors’ 
protection, more transparent market structures and practices, better 
supervision, etc.65
For example, in June 2017, for the first time since it was set up 
at the start of 2015, the SRB enacted a ‘resolution scheme’, forcing the 
Spanish Banco Popular to sell itself to Banco Santander for just €1.66 By 
59 BRRD (n 8). 
60 ‘Bankruptcy offers an individual or business a chance to start fresh by forgiving debts 
that simply cannot be paid, while offering creditors a chance to obtain some measure of 
repayment based on the individual’s or business’ assets available for liquidation. In theory, 
the ability to file for bankruptcy can benefit an overall economy by giving persons and 
businesses a second chance to gain access to consumer credit and by providing creditors 
with a measure of debt repayment. Upon the successful completion of bankruptcy proceed-
ings, the debtor is relieved of the debt obligations incurred prior to filing for bankruptcy.’ 
See also ʽBankruptcyʼ Investopedia <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bankruptcy.
asp#ixzz4e5aeZA16> accessed 15 April 2017.
61 Bankruptcy (n 60).
62 World Bank Group, Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook 
to the BRRD (FinSac, 2016) <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/609571482207234996/
FinSAC-BRRD-Guidebook.pdf>accessed 10 April 2017. 
63 ‘Insolvency Proceedings refer to any case, action or proceeding before a court relating 
to bankruptcy, reorganization, insolvency, liquidation, receivership, dissolution, winding-
up or relief of debtors, or any general assignment for the benefit of creditors, composition, 
marshalling of assets for creditors, or other similar arrangement in respect of its creditors 
generally or any substantial portion of its creditors.’ See ʽInsolvencyʼ Investopedia <http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insolvency.asp> accessed 15 April 2017; Council Regula-
tion (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L160.
64 BRRD (nn 8 and 59) art 45.
65 ibid, art 38.
66 Fiona Maxwell ‘Europe’s Banking Rules Show Teeth’ (Politico, 7 June 2017)
<http://www.politico.eu/article/europes-banking-rules-show-teeth/> accessed 27 July 2017.
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engineering things so that Spain’s largest bank took over its sixth larg-
est, EU regulators allowed the ailing Banco Popular operation to continue 
under normal business conditions while preventing a messy financial 
meltdown.67 As envisaged in the Single Rulebook, the bank’s investors 
suffered financial consequences, but, on the other side, a taxpayer bail-
out and the risk of sovereign default were avoided.68
2.3 The single resolution board and its powers
To put it simply, the Board is the central part and the main resolu-
tion authority within the EBU. Together with the National Resolution 
Authorities (hereinafter: NRA) of the MSs, it forms the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), and works closely on the resolution process with the 
Commission, the European Parliament, the ECB and National Compe-
tent Authorities (hereinafter: NCA).69 As Elke König, Chair of the SRB, 
said ‘The SRB was created as a mean through which bailouts and fail-
ing, the worst-case scenario, of financial institutions in the Eurozone will 
be avoided’.70 The SRB is set up as an EU agency, with headquarters in 
Brussels, and legal personality.71 It is comprised of a Chair, where four 
full-time executive members sit plus a member of the NRA that were set-
up in the Eurozone MSs, all 19 of them.72 The representatives of the ECB 
and the European Commission have permanent observer status in ple-
nary and executive sessions.73 The SRB is financed by the private sector 
and its budget is not part of the EU budget, so its funding and resolution 
activities should not inflict budgetary liability on the MSs.74 A wide range 
of financial institutions fall directly under its responsibility, namely all 
cross-border and significant banks, those that have assets exceeding €30 
billion, whilst the NRA of the MS supervises other less significant institu-
tions in the country.75
67 ibid.
68 ibid.
69 Nikolaos Papanikolaou, ʽThe Road Towards the Establishment of the European Banking 
Unionʼ (2015) MPRA Paper 62463 <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/62463> 
accessed 10 April 2017. 
70 Single Resolution Board <https://srb.europa.eu/> accessed 10 April 2017.
71 SRM Regulation (n 13) art 7(5).
72 ibid, art 43.
73 ibid, art 43(3).
74 SRM Regulation (n 13) art 57(2). It is, however, possible that some activities within the 
resolution procedure depend on financing from the EU budget. Such situations have been 
recognised in the SRF-IGA provisions where the Eurozone MSs agree to reimburse the MS 
outside the Eurozone and supervision for their share of the EU budget used to meet li-
abilities and costs in relation to tasks stipulated in the SRMR; SRM Regulation Recital 99; 
SRF-IGA Recital 21, art 15.
75 ibid, art 15.
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The SRB is vested with various powers designed to complement the 
separate roles that it plays as a single Union resolution authority. Start-
ing with the broadest one, the SRB is ‘responsible for the effective and 
consistent functioning of the SRM’.76 Still, it is bound to exercise its tasks 
‘in close cooperation with national resolution authorities’.77
The powers given to SRB in order to ensure the effective functioning 
of the EU economy include several categories:
- the SRB issues guidelines and general instructions to national 
resolution authorities according to which the tasks are performed and 
resolution decisions are adopted;
- investigatory powers, including on-site inspections;
- supervisory powers as regards the execution of the resolution 
scheme by the national resolution authorities, and supervisory powers 
at the SRB’s own request over the performance of the tasks initially en-
trusted to the national resolution authorities;
- the SRB receives from national resolution authorities draft deci-
sions on which it may express its views; and
- sanctioning powers in certain cases.78
Since the Board is the focal point of the EBU, it has at its disposal 
a wide range of powers. Because the Board is ‘only’ an EU agency, this 
makes its establishment significant, high profile and controversial.79 The 
SRB’s powers enable the EU to have an effective single venue in dealing 
with potential bank failures and banking and financial crisis. However, it 
should be stressed that the establishment of such a powerful EU agency 
and the transfer of such implementing powers from the national level to 
the EU level should be conducted in accordance with the current consti-
tutional framework as envisaged by the ratified Treaty of Lisbon. 
In the course of examining various powers of the SRB, the relation 
to the principle of institutional balance, explained in the introductory 
section, is worth mentioning. Do its powers in any way encroach on any 
of the powers of other bodies and, even more importantly, institutions, 
76 Marta Božina Beroš, ʽSome Reflections on the Governance and Accountability of the 
Single Resolution Boardʼ (2017) TARN Working Paper Series 3/2017 <https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940198> accessed 17 April 2017.
77 ibid, 1-14.
78 Single Resolution Board, ʽThe Single Resolution Mechanism: Introduction to Resolution 
Planningʼ (2016)<https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/intro_resplanning.pdf.pdf> ac-
cessed 10 April 2017.
79 Bernhard Speyer, ‘EU Banking Union – Right Idea, Poor Execution’ (Deutsche Bank Re-
search, EU Monitor, 4 September 2014) 14 <www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTER-
NET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000319670/EU+Banking+Union%3A+Right+idea,+poor+ex
ecution.PDF> accessed 17 April 2017.
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notably the European Commission as the executive arm of the Union? 
According to Andromachi Georgosouli, the SRB’s sanctioning powers, 
like the one to impose a penalty on a bank that has failed to supply 
requested information,80 are not a cause for concern because they are 
‘heavily qualified and are to be activated in very limited circumstances’.81 
In today’s world of alternative facts, reality is nothing, perception is 
everything,82 so it is necessary not only for the establishment of such a 
powerful EU agency and the transfer of such implementing powers from 
the national level to the EU level to be done in accordance with the cur-
rent constitutional framework, but also that it is perceived in such a way 
by the European public.
Even though the EU has claimed it has respected the necessary legal 
and political requirements, it is not perceived in that way. For instance, 
the winding-up of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza gave the 
EU a bad press even from pro-EU media, eg: ‘the European Union au-
thorities seem to be making up the rules on banking bailouts as they go 
along, yet one cannot get around the fact that the spirit of the relevant EU 
banking directive has been ignored. The rules apply, except when they 
don’t, it seems’.83
Since (the at times unwarranted) poor perception of the EU is hurt-
ing its cause, it is imperative to settle the debate about the appropriate-
ness of article 114 TFEU for the establishment of the SRB. Someone may 
ask how the judicial debate concerning the appropriate legal basis for the 
conferral of powers on the SRB affects the perception of the SRB’s legiti-
macy. The answer is that if the scathing criticism is undeserving, without 
a rebuttal of such criticism, the prevailing conclusion will be that the 
SRB was not constructed on legitimate grounds.
3 The Single Resolution Board and the principle of conferral: an odd 
couple? 
The EU is often accused of ‘power grab’ when it bestows powers on 
a current or a newly created EU agency.84 This is the consequence of the 
80 SRM Regulation (n 13) arts 38(2)(a), 39(1)(a).
81 For more details on SRB’s sanctioning powers, see Andromachi Georgosouli, ‘Regulatory 
Incentive Realignment and the EU Legal Framework of Bank Resolution’ (2016) 10(2) Brook-
lyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law <http://brooklynworks.brooklaw.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216&context=bjcfcl> accessed 25 April 2017.
82 Terry Goodkind, Sword of Truth: Wizard’s First Rule (vol 1, TOR 1997) 357.
83 Nils Pratley, ‘Italy’s €17bn Bank Job: Self-Preservation at a Long-Term EU Price?’ 
The Guardian (London, 26 June 2017)<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/
jun/26/italy-bank-eu-rescue-veneto-banca-banca-popolare-di-vicenza> accessed 7 August 
2017.
84 Lana Clements, ʽEU Power Grab: Brussels Tries to Take Control of Non-EU Banks through 
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constitutional structure of the EU, which is based on the conferral of 
powers by the MSs to the EU level. The principle of conferral is that the 
EU is a Union of MSs, and all its competences are voluntarily conferred 
on it by its MSs.85 Therefore, the creation of a new agency has to fit within 
the enumeration of powers in the Treaties.
To put it simply, the EU can bestow powers on an EU agency, ie cre-
ate a new EU agency by two methods. The first method is via a ‘specific’ 
legal basis for the particular policy pursued.86 The institutions agreed 
that the legal instrument that establishes an individual regulatory agen-
cy has to have for its legal basis an article of the Treaty which constitutes 
the specific legal basis for the particular policy pursued.87 For the Board, 
that ‘specific’ legal basis was article 114 TFEU which requires the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council to adopt the measures in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure.88
The second method is via a ‘residual’ legal basis, meaning it can be 
used when no other Treaty article allows Community competence to be 
exercised.89 That ‘residual’ legal basis is article 352 TFEU90 which requires 
the Council to reach the decision unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament 
(see more on the appropriateness of using article 352 TFEU instead of 
article 114 TFEU in subsection 3.2). 
Whereas Article 352 TFEU demands unanimity in the Council and 
therefore gives each MS a power of veto, the procedure of article 114 
TFEU is governed by the ordinary legislative procedure, and an individual 
Reformsʼ Express (London 24 November 2016) <www.express.co.uk/finance/city/736059/
EU-POWER-GRAB-Brussels-non-EU-banks-reforms> accessed 15 April 2017.
85 Conferral (n 29).
86 Commission, ʽDraft of Interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for the 
European regulatory agenciesʼ COM (2005) 59 final, 13.
87 ibid, art 16.
88 Although there are a lot of stages and exceptions to the ordinary legislative procedure, it 
is basically a co-decision process of adopting a new legislation in five steps. The European 
Commission submits a proposal to the Council and the European Parliament. The Council 
and the Parliament adopt a legislative proposal either at the first reading or at the second 
reading. If the two institutions do not reach an agreement after the second reading, a con-
ciliation committee is convened. If the text agreed by the conciliation committee is accept-
able to both institutions at the third reading, the legislative act is adopted. If a legislative 
proposal is rejected at any stage of the procedure, or if the Parliament and Council cannot 
reach a compromise, the proposal is not adopted and the procedure ends. See, European 
Parliament, Legislative powers, Ordinary legislative procedure <http://www.europarl.euro-
pa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers> accessed 27 March 
2017.
89 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Framework Regulation for Macro-Financial Assistance’ SEC 
(2011) 865 final. 
90 TFEU, art 352  (ex Article 308 TEC) (2008) 115 Official Journal 0196. 
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MS can be outvoted which consequently means that they have less sov-
ereignty and less control over the decision-making. Does that mean that 
the procedure of article 114 TFEU is contrary to the fundamental EU law 
principle of conferral? No, because each MS voluntarily gave up a bit of its 
sovereignty when ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving its consent 
to the usage of article 114 TFEU and the possibility of being outvoted in 
favour of the greater good – the internal market of the EU. However, MSs 
did not give carte blanche to the EU in deciding when unanimous consent 
of the Council is needed and when it is not. MSs gave up a bit of their 
sovereignty and gave their consent to the use of article 114 TFEU and 
the possibility of being outvoted only under the prescribed conditions of 
article 114 TFEU. The exact wording of article 114(1) TFEU is:
1. Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following pro-
visions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in 
Article 26. The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after con-
sulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for 
the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market.91
Since this paper delves into the problem of bestowing powers on EU 
agencies and the potential of an infraction of the principle of conferral, 
in order to ensure a better understanding, subsection 3.1, will briefly 
present EU agencies in general and examine the institutional and inter-
institutional acts surrounding the factual development of EU agencies. 
Then, the section will examine the aforementioned first main question of 
the paper: ‘Was article 114 TFEU a valid legal basis for the adoption of 
the SRM Regulation by which the EU agency “Single Resolution Board” 
was established?’
The case law (eg Tobacco Advertising and ESMA)92 explained that 
two cumulative conditions have to be fulfilled for the use of Article 114 
TFEU as a valid legal basis for a measure, including for the creation of an 
agency. Therefore, it is crucial to contemplate whether these two condi-
tions were fulfilled. The conditions are the following:93
- a measure has to be adopted for the approximation of the provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action (hereinafter: 
approximation of the provisions); and
91 Art 114 TFEU (ex article 95 TEC) (2008) 115 OJ C94. 
92 ESMA (n 34) para 100; Case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parlia-
ment and Council of the European Union ECLI:EU:C:2000:544, paras 75–105.
93 ESMA (n 34) para 100.
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- its object has to be the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.
Therefore, subsection 3.2, will first scrutinise whether the first con-
dition of article 114 TFEU has been met. More precisely, it will examine 
whether a centralisation of a resolution mechanism leads to the approxi-
mation of the provisions and whether the setting up of an EU agency 
with centralised implementing powers leads to the approximation of the 
provisions.
After this, subsection 3.3 will evaluate whether the second condition 
of article 114 TFEU has been met. More precisely, it will examine whether 
the object of centralisation of a resolution mechanism is the establish-
ment and the functioning of the internal market and whether the object 
of setting up an EU agency with centralised implementing powers is the 
establishment and the functioning of the internal market.
If both conditions of article 114 TFEU are cumulatively fulfilled, the 
decision to establish the Board (which was taken through the ordinary 
legislative procedure) is valid and in accordance with the Treaty of Lis-
bon. On the other hand, if the two conditions of article 114 TFEU are not 
cumulatively fulfilled, the decision to establish the Board was reached 
on an invalid legal basis and should have been reached in the Council 
by a unanimous decision and on the legal basis of article 352 TFEU. If 
that is the case, then the answer to the first main question is negative; 
article 114 TFEU was not a valid legal basis for the adoption of the SRM 
Regulation by which the Board was established. Moreover, it would mean 
that the Board was not established in accordance with the constitutional 
framework of the EU.
By the creation of agencies with implementing and enforcement pow-
ers at the EU level, the decisions enacted at the European level cease to 
be dependent on the MS bodies, thus modifying the EU federal level into 
a self-sufficient legal order.
It should be considered that any transition from a system of EU ver-
tical federalism to a system of EU horizontal federalism is built on sand 
if it is based on an infraction of the principle of conferral, a fundamental 
EU law principle.
As many (in academia and, eg, Wolfgang Schäuble)94 have claimed 
that article 114 TFEU was not an appropriate legal basis, and that the 
SRM Regulation could only have been adopted on the basis of article 352 
TFEU, it should be considered whether article 114 TFEU was, in fact, the 
appropriate legal basis.
94 Engelen (n 35); Hofmann and Morini (n 45) 419.
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Another line of thinking might be whether the judicial interpretation 
of the reach of article 114 TFEU is sufficient, in the first place, to justify 
the SRB’s powers in order to say that the SRB was built on a rock. As the 
interpretation of article 114 TFEU has been criticised as being too broad, 
one might ask if this judicial test is sufficient to understand whether the 
SRB exercises legitimate powers.95 Although this is an interesting line 
of thinking, the paper will not go into further analysis, because such 
a question is less about whether the establishment of the SRB was in 
accordance with current EU constitutional framework than about the 
Court’s previous and current interpretation of the constitutional frame-
work in general, regardless of the SRB, which would unfortunately ex-
ceed the scope of this paper.
3.1 General overview of EU agencies 
Agencies appeared for the first time on the EU institutional land-
scape in 1975, a greater number of them were established in the 1990s,96 
and 2016 finished with more than 30 of them.97 Although each individual 
agency has its specific raison d’être, generally speaking, the need for the 
creation of agencies can be broadly linked to the development of a system 
of integrated administration in Europe.98 With the ‘grand’ EU institutions 
more or less susceptible to the interests of the various MSs and politics, 
the establishment of more ‘technical’ agencies to offer support from the 
stage of decision-making up to the implementation of Community policies 
was not opposed by institutions or MSs per se. Rather, they started to be 
questioned once it was realised that with the pace of their establishment 
and ever-wider competences they were taking up unmistakable space on 
the EU’s institutional landscape, but without a stronghold in its Treaty or 
in any of its acts, for that matter. As will be seen, despite the numerous 
interinstitutional documents dealing with this matter, the problem of the 
legal basis and the scope of powers, both from the perspective of the MSs 
and academia, became once again visible with the setting up of the SRB.
 
95 See more in S Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after To-
bacco Advertising: How the Court’s Case Law Has Become a Drafting Guide’ (2011) 12 Ger-
man L J 827.
96 Commission, ʽThe operating framework for the European Regulatory Agenciesʼ (Commu-
nication) COM (2002) 718 final.
97 A list of decentralised EU agencies which help to implement policies and to make deci-
sions is available at <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/decentral-
ised-agencies_en> accessed 26 March 2017.
98 For a more in-depth introduction to the notion of the functional, organisational and 
procedural point of view of EU administration, see Herwig CH Hofmann, Gerard Rowe and 
Alexander Türk (eds), Administrative Law and Policy of the EU (OUP 2011) 3. For an analy-
sis of the notion of networks of administrations, see eg Wolfgang Weiss, Der Europäische 
Verwaltungsverbund, (Duncker & Humblot 2010) 85.
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To start from the basics, agencies as distinctive bodies were not 
mentioned in the Founding Treaties until the Treaty of Lisbon, and even 
there they appear in most cases just in the sequence comprising ‘institu-
tions, bodies, offices and agencies’ related to the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice over the acts of such bodies. Any definition or description of 
what is an EU agency was not included.
In the early 2000s, the White Paper on European Governance envis-
aged agencies as a means to the better application of EU rules,99 while 
the Commission’s Communication on ‘Better Law-making’ saw them as 
the Commission’s partners in an executive function.100 Their usefulness 
to ‘facilitate the use of experts outside the normal bureaucratic struc-
ture (…) and insulate technical regulatory issues from political change’101 
was evident, but what was lacking were more coherent and transparent 
provisions for their operation and supervision. Governed by that aim, in 
the Commission’s Communication ‘The operating framework for the Eu-
ropean Regulatory Agencies’, two main types of agencies were identified 
– executive and regulatory ones, with two subtypes of the latter, decision-
making and regulatory agencies.102 
Conditions for creating and governing executive agencies which are 
always set up for a limited period of time are found in Council Regula-
tion No 58/2003, which entrusts them with managerial tasks and sub-
jects them to strict supervision by the Commission.103 Due to the nar-
rower scope of their tasks, lesser independence, and a clearer position in 
the Union’s institutional framework, there are fewer encompassing legal 
problems. 
On the other hand, regulatory agencies are set up indefinitely to be 
actively involved in the executive in order to regulate a specific sector 
at the Community level rather than at the MS level.104 Decision-making 
agencies are empowered to ‘enact instruments binding on third parties’, 
but mostly in the area where the predominant public interest is clear 
and where there is no need to exercise political judgment.105 Regulatory 
agencies do not have real decision-making powers, but rather assist the 
99 Commission, ʽWhite Paper on Governanceʼ COM (2001) 428 final.
100 Commission, ʽEuropean Governance: Better law-makingʼ COM (2002) 275 final.
101 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th edn, OUP 
2015) 69.
102 Commission, ʽThe operating framework for the European Regulatory Agenciesʼ (Commu-
nication) COM (2002) 718 final.
103 Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 of 19 December 2002 laying down the statute for 
executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community 
programmes OJ L11/1.
104 Commission (n 89) art 4.
105 Craig and Búrca (n 101).
236 Ana Kozina, Stefan Martinić, Vedrana Mihalić: The EU’s Single Resolution Board
Commission with organisation and coordination in performing executive 
tasks in the area where high technical specialisation is needed.106
From these few first documents, it can be inferred that the SRB 
would fall into the second category as a regulatory agency, and more 
precisely as a decision-making agency. On the other hand, the constraint 
of the ‘clear and predominant public interest and the absence of political 
judgment’ as one of the main characteristics of the group is hardly imagi-
nable in the case of the SRB, given the highly sensitive area it operates in.
3.1.1 The Commission’s draft interinstitutional agreement on the operating 
framework for European Regulatory Agencies 
The Commission’s Draft Interinstitutional Agreement on the oper-
ating framework for European regulatory agencies,107 submitted to the 
Council and Parliament in 2005, followed (though not always)108 in more 
detail on the broad principles laid down in the Communication meant to 
govern the creation, the functioning, the powers accorded to the agen-
cies, their internal structure, the financial and budgetary aspects, as well 
as the controls to be conducted over them.
The most important issue was clarification of the position agencies 
were taking in the Union’s institutional landscape and the issue of, first, 
the possibility of conferral of powers to the agencies, and, second, the 
scope of that conferral. The range of powers which may be accorded to 
EU agencies is important from the perspective of both the EU institutions 
and the MSs, because of the principle of institutional balance for the for-
mer and the principle of conferral of powers for the latter.
As mentioned above, the institutions agreed that the legal instru-
ment that establishes an individual regulatory agency has to have for its 
legal basis an article of the Treaty which constitutes the specific legal ba-
sis for the particular policy pursued, as opposed to the practice until that 
point to use article 352 TFEU (ex 308 EC).109 This article retained its role 
as a ‘residual’ legal basis, meaning it can be used when no other Treaty 
article allows Community competence to be exercised.110
106 Commission (n 96).
107 Commission, ʽDraft Interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for the Eu-
ropean regulatory agenciesʼ COM (2005) 59 final.
108 Compare, for example, the envisaged appointment of the ʽDirector of the Board of the 
agency in the operating framework for the European Regulatory Agenciesʼ COM (2002) 718 
final, arts 8-10 and in the ʽDraft Interinstitutional Agreement on the operating framework 
for the European regulatory agenciesʼ COM (2005) 59 final 16.
109 Commission (n 107) para 13.
110 ibid, para 14.
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On the notion of conferral of powers, the Commission’s Draft indi-
cates the constraints of the ‘institutional system and the case law of the 
Court of Justice’, referring to the Meroni and Romano judgments.111 In 
accordance with the mentioned judgments, the Commission stated that 
the agencies may not:
- adopt general regulatory measures; 
- have decision-making powers conferred on them in areas in which 
they would be required to arbitrate in conflicts between public inter-
ests or exercise political discretion; 
- have responsibilities entrusted to them with respect to which the 
EC Treaty has conferred direct decision-making powers on the Com-
mission.112
Additionally, it stated that ‘(a)ny powers delegated by the legislative 
authority must be strictly defined and subject to rigorous controls’.113
Reference was made to the Meroni judgment due, apart from facts 
concerned with EU agencies, to the principle of institutional balance be-
ing derived precisely from it, requiring that ‘each (…) institution has to 
act in accordance with the powers conferred on it by the Treaties, in ac-
cordance with the division of powers’.114 It was important, not just for 
reasons of the political accountability of the body, because one may point 
out that the European parliament is the only democratically elected EU 
institution, but also for the checks and balances between institutions 
and the architecture of their powers as laid down in the Treaties to which 
the MSs had agreed, to create space for the agencies, but by not taking 
anyone else’s. Additionally, the existence and role of EU bodies as yet an-
other example of ‘communitarisation’ within the EU but without a solid 
ground in the Treaty – only this time not in the legislative sense but in the 
executive sense of trading vertical federalism for horizontal federalism – 
had to be addressed in a way that would not upset MSs.
According to Merijn Chamon, the limits the Commission was seek-
ing to impose had already been exceeded by the powers granted to the 
existing agencies. Chamon concluded that the ‘Commission’s proposal 
111 Commission (n 107) para 5; see more in Case C 9/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche, 
SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (Meroni) ECLI:EU:C:1958:7; 
Case C 98/80 Giuseppe Romano v Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidit (Romano) 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:104.
112 Commission (n 107) paras 11-2.
113 Commission (n 107) para 12.
114 EUR-Lex, Glossary of Summaries <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/insti-
tutional_balance.html> accessed 16 October 2017.
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consists for a large part in codifying existing agency practice but fails to 
address certain fundamental issues’.115
It seems that the Commission more often expresses in its documents 
the need for a meaningful framework governing the delegation of pow-
ers to the agencies with an accompanying vague referral to, mostly, the 
Meroni doctrine116 than it manages to extract from it clear, precise and 
transparent conditions. One has to agree with Chamon that it seems that 
the factual evolution of the agencies is always one step ahead of the insti-
tutions that are trying to keep pace with the interpretation of the Treaties 
as they look at a given moment.
The discussion with the Parliament and the Council on the draft 
interinstitutional agreement ended fruitlessly, though not completely 
without the expressed will to cooperate.117 In 2008, the Commission, in 
the Communication ‘European Agencies: The way forward’, repeated the 
need for a ‘common vision about the role and functions of regulatory 
agencies’ but ultimately withdrew its proposed draft interinstitutional 
agreement.118 
In the same document, the Commission announced that it would pro-
pose no new regulatory agencies until the end of 2009,119 but, faced with 
the consequences of the financial and economic crisis of the 2008,120 in the 
wake of the creation of the EBU, proposed the establishment of the ESMA, 
115 Merijn Chamon, ‘EU Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine Make Sense?’ (2010) 17(3) 
Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 281.
116 The so-called ‘Meroni doctrine’ confirms the ability of the EU Institutions to delegate 
powers to EU agencies, but also constrains the delegation of such powers where their use 
would require the exercise of wide discretion. The Court’s judgment laid down three key 
conditions (ie three key criteria) of the ‘Meroni doctrine’: First condition: an Institution may 
not delegate powers that it does not itself possess; Second condition: delegation of powers, 
which ‘involves clearly defined executive powers [...] which can be subject to strict review in 
light of objective criteria, determined by the delegating authority’, is permissible; Third con-
dition: delegation of powers which ‘involves a discretionary power, implying a wide margin 
of discretion, which may [...] make possible the execution of actual economic policy’ is im-
permissible. This is because the power ‘replaces the choices of the delegator by the choices 
of the delegate’ and thereby ‘brings about an actual transfer of responsibility’. Meroni (n 
111) para 152; for example, the Commission states that ‘(…) this power will be limited (…) in 
accordance with the institutional system and the case law of the Court of Justice’, referring 
in the footnote to the Meroni case.
117 See also European Parliament Resolution on the Draft interinstitutional agreement pre-
sented by the Commission on the operating framework for the European regulatory agen-
cies (2006) OJ C285/123 and the Answer of Lord Bach (President-in-Office of the Council) 
to oral question 0-0093/2005 by Jo Leinen and Janusz Lewandowski, on behalf of the 
AFCO Committee, to the Council on the ʽDraft interinstitutional agreement on the operating 
framework for the European regulatory agenciesʼ.
118 Commission, ‘Communication to the European Parliament and the Council - European 
Agencies – The way forward’ COM (2008) 135 final, formally done in Withdrawal of obsolete 
Commission proposals (2009) OJ C71/17.
119 Commission, European agencies (n 118) 9.
120 Chamon (n 115) 45.
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the European Banking Authority (hereinafter: EBA) and the European In-
surance and Occupational Pensions Authority (hereinafter: EIOPA).121
In addition, one more body has emerged from the Commission’s 2008 
Communication, an Inter-Institutional Working Group (IIWG) whose role 
was to address ‘a number of key issues’ regarding agencies, and its work, 
in turn, resulted in the ‘Joint Statement of the European Parliament, 
the Council of the EU and the European Commission on decentralised 
agencies’ of 2012.122 It was, finally, ‘the first political agreement on EU 
decentralised agencies of its kind’ which would serve as a ‘political blue-
print guiding future horizontal initiatives and reforms of individual EU 
agencies.’123 The document that was labelled as flesh on the bones of the 
Joint Statement was the Commission’s ‘Roadmap on the follow-up to the 
Common Approach on EU decentralised agencies’ adopted at the end of 
2012.124 The Commission gave as its main objective for the implemen-
tation of the Common Approach ‘more balanced governance, improved 
efficiency and accountability and greater coherence’.125 It provided more 
detailed, technical guidelines for the establishment and functioning of 
agencies,126 including articulate criteria for assessing their work. This 
time, it was clear that agencies were there to stay.
After this quick general description of the process of ‘agencification’ 
at the EU level, we should now turn to the issue of the appropriateness of 
article 114 TFEU for the establishment of the SRB. 
121 Commission, ʽProposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Banking Authorityʼ COM (2009) 501 final; Commission, ʽProposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authorityʼ COM (2009) 502 final.
122 European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Commission, ‘Joint Statement on 
decentralised agencies’ (2012) <https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/
docs/body/joint_ statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf> accessed 29 August 
2017.
123 Commission, ‘Roadmap on the Follow- Up to the Common Approach on EU decentralised 
Agencies COM (2014) 86 final <https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/
docs/body/2012-12-18_roadmap_on_the_follow_up_to_the_common_approach_on_eu_de-
centralised_agencies_en.pdf> accessed 27 August 2017.
124 Commission, ‘Roadmap on the Follow-Up to the Common Approach on EU decentral-
ised Agencies (press release) (2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1396_
en.htm> accessed 20 August 2017.
125 Commission (n 123).
126 The usefulness of the setting up of the SRB was explicitly mentioned in a report by 
the Commission. Commission, ‘Progress report on the implementation of the Common Ap-
proach’ (2015) <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-179-
EN-F1-1.PDF> accessed 27 August 2017.
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3.2 The first condition of article 114(1) TFEU - approximation of 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action
The first condition of article 114(1) TFEU states that the measure in 
question has to be ‘adopted for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action’.127 In order to conclude 
what such a requirement means for the establishment of an agency, it is 
necessary to consider the case law of the Court concerning the first con-
dition of article 114(1) TFEU in order to analyse:
- whether centralisation of a resolution mechanism leads to the ap-
proximation of the provisions; and
- whether the setting up of an EU agency (ie the SRB) with central-
ised implementing powers leads to the approximation of the provi-
sions.
As regards the centralisation of a resolution mechanism, it is im-
portant to emphasise that the BRRD sets only the minimum harmonisa-
tion rules relating to the resolution of banks within the EBU, and thus 
does not completely avoid the risk of taking divergent, national-incentive 
driven decisions of the NRAs.128 Therefore, uniform provisions of the SRM 
as a regulation, which are consistent with those in the BRRD,129 ensure a 
level playing field within financial markets but only through the central-
ised application of the resolution rules by a single Union authority, ie the 
SRB.130 Hence, it can be concluded that the centralisation of a resolution 
mechanism leads to the approximation of the provisions. 
Moreover, a conclusion should be reached that the setting up of an 
EU agency (ie the SRB) with centralised implementing powers leads to 
the approximation of the provisions because it avoids the risk of taking 
divergent, national-incentive driven decisions of the NRAs.
It is useful to have one central agency at the EU level that is in 
charge of resolution, rather than multiple NRAs for the sake of the effec-
tive and uniform application of law. Such an EU agency with centralised 
implementing powers is an effective tool to combat omnipresent banking 
sector issues and crises. On the other hand, NRAs are not marginal-
ised, but retain their relevance as SRB informers, partners in preparing 
resolution schemes and executors of its resolution decisions.131 However, 
127 TFEU (n 15) art 114(1). 
128 SRM Regulation (n 13) Recital 10.
129 ibid, Recital 18.
130 ibid, Recitals 16, 21.
131 Single Resolution Board, ‘Decision of the plenary session of the Board of 28 June 2016 
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even though such an EU agency with centralised implementing powers 
is an effective tool, still all the other legal requirements must be fulfilled 
because the EU cannot go with the Machiavellian logic that ‘the end justi-
fies the means’.132
When discussing the setting up of an EU agency with centralised im-
plementing powers, it is important to mention the landmark case Smoke 
Flavourings.133 In it, the Court rejected the idea that the expression 
‘measure for the approximation’ from article 114 TFEU always means a 
measure that itself harmonises national laws, in a way that, for example, 
regulations do, or that it requires simultaneous enactment of identical 
legislation in each MS.134 Rather, the judgment clarifies that ‘the authors 
of the Treaty intended to confer on the Community legislature a discre-
tion (…) as regards the harmonization technique most appropriate for 
achieving the desired result, in particular in fields which are character-
ized by complex technical features.’135 In the same judgment, the Court 
asked that where the harmonisation process is comprised within several 
stages, the Union legislator has to determine in the basic legislative act 
all the essential elements of the measure in question and only conse-
quently a mechanism for implementing those elements.136
Further development as regard the scope of the expression ‘a meas-
ure for approximation’ occurred in the ENISA case, where the Court ex-
plicitly stated that ‘(t)he legislature may deem it necessary to provide for 
the establishment of a Community body responsible for contributing to 
the implementation of a process of harmonization’.137
In the ESMA case, it was added that an EU body as a measure con-
tributing to the sought harmonisation was particularly justified when 
‘the measures to be adopted are dependent on specific professional and 
technical expertise and the ability of such a body to respond swiftly and 
appropriately’.138
The ESMA case will be mentioned throughout the paper due to the 
similarity of issues surrounding the ESMA and the SRB, both EU agen-
cies established on the basis of article 114 TFEU. The ESMA case was an 
establishing the framework for the practical arrangements for the cooperation within the 
Single Resolution Mechanism between the Single Resolution Board and national resolution 
authorities’ PS (2016) <https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/srb_ps_2016_07.pdf> ac-
cessed 29 March 2017.
132 Nicolò Machiavelli, The Prince (first published 1532, Bantam Dell 1996) 122.
133 Case C 66/04 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parlia-
ment and Council of the European Union (Smoke Flavourings) ECLI:EU:C:2005:743.
134 ibid, paras 20, 28.
135 ibid, para 45.
136 ibid, paras 47 - 49.
137 ENISA (n 26). 
138 ESMA (n 37) para 105.
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indicator of the Court’s direction towards the EU agencies. Therefore, a 
brief explanation of the case is needed. 
The Short Selling Regulation was adopted on the basis of article 114 
TFEU.139 Article 28 of the regulation vests the ESMA with certain pow-
ers of intervention.140 Accordingly, ESMA may adopt measures that are 
legally binding on the EU Member States’ financial markets where there 
is a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or 
to the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the EU.141
As already mentioned, the UK brought an action before the Court of 
Justice seeking the annulment of article 28 of the Regulation.142 The UK 
submitted that article 114 TFEU was not the correct legal basis for the 
adoption of the rules laid down in article 28 of the Regulation.143 The UK 
also contended that ESMA had been given a very large measure of discre-
tion of a political nature which was at odds with EU principles relating to 
the delegation of powers.144 
In his Opinion, AG Niilo Jääskinen emphasises that whilst in prin-
ciple there can be no objection to using article 114 TFEU as a legal basis 
for EU agencies which adopt legally binding decisions, the determining 
factor is whether the decisions of the agency in question either contribute 
to or amount to internal market harmonisation.145 In his view, the powers 
vested in ESMA under article 28 of the Regulation go beyond these lim-
its; the AG points out that ESMA is uniquely empowered to make legally 
binding decisions in substitution of those of a competent national author-
ity, which may well disagree with the decision of ESMA.146 This decision 
will prevail over any previous measure taken by the national authority.147 
In the AG’s view, the effect of this is to create an EU level emergency 
decision-making mechanism that becomes operable when the national 
authorities do not agree on a course of action.148 Hence, the outcome is 
not harmonisation but the replacement of national decision-making with 
EU level decision-making, which goes beyond the limits of article 114.149
After having rejected article 114 TFEU as an appropriate legal basis, 
the AG suggested the use of article 352 TFEU to grant the ESMA contested 
139 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (n 38).
140 ibid.
141 ESMA (n 37).
142 ibid.
143 ibid, paras 88–90.
144 ibid, paras 28–34.
145 Opinion of AG Jääskinen (n 40).
146 ibid, para 57.
147 ibid, para 59.
148 ibid, para 51.
149 ibid, para 52.
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powers since the contested powers were still necessary to prevent the in-
ternal market in financial services from being distorted.150 The AG added 
to this that article 352 TFEU would have enhanced democratic input, 
given the unanimity requirement in the Council.151
The Court ruled to the contrary, dismissing the UK’s and the AG’s 
arguments by claiming that article 28 of the Regulation was in fact direct-
ed, in keeping with the spirit of article 114 TFEU, at the harmonisation 
of the Member States’ laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the supervision of a number of stocks, and the monitoring, in 
specific situations, of certain commercial transactions concerning those 
stocks.152 Similarly, the Court states that the purpose of the powers pro-
vided for in article 28 of the Regulation is to improve, in accordance with 
article 114 TFEU, conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market in the financial field.153 Accordingly, the Court found that 
article 114 TFEU constitutes an appropriate legal basis for the adoption 
of article 28 of the Regulation.154 
Another judgment worth mentioning is the Vodafone case.155 It was 
the first judgment, concerning a type of measure a body can take, to still 
be considered within the boundaries of article 114 TFEU.156 It was stated 
there that measures for harmonisation can be directly addressed to mar-
ket operators, since previous measures directed towards the MSs proved 
to be inefficient.157 Moreover, the Court stressed in ENISA that ‘nothing in 
the wording of Article 95 EC [now 114 TFEU] implies that the addressees 
of the measures (…) can only be the individual MSs’.158 Furthermore, in 
the General Product Safety judgment it was ascertained that laying down 
measures relating to a specific product or class of products is allowed, as 
is laying down individual measures concerning those products.159
What solidifies the SRB’s position is the fact that the provisions 
of the BRRD and the SRM are material law – essential elements of the 
measure laid down in the basic legislative act and are implemented 
through the mechanism of the SRB, being together two inherent and 
150 ibid, para 54. See Chamon (n 115) 47. 
151 ibid, para 58.
152 ESMA (n 37) para 112.
153 ibid, para 113.
154 ibid, para 114.
155 Case C 58/08 The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of 
State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (Vodafone) ECLI:EU:C:2010:321.
156 ibid.
157 ibid, para 78.
158 ENISA (n 26) para 44.
159 Case C 359/92 Federal Republic of Germany v Council of the European Union (General 
Product Safety) ECLI:EU:C:1994:306, para 37.
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consecutive steps of the same harmonisation effort,160 as requested in 
the Smoke Flavourings judgement.161 The SRB, as a Union agency, as 
mentioned above, is a constitutive part of the process of harmonisation, 
and tasks conferred on it are closely linked to the subject matter of the 
BRRD and the SRM which are aimed at the approximation of the national 
resolution rules and administrative practices.162 
From the presented relevant case law, it seems that the SRB, as an 
EU agency with centralised implementing powers which has the power to 
adopt individual measures and address them to the NRAs or directly to 
the credit institutions,163 can be considered as a measure for approxima-
tion, therefore justifying the first condition of article 114(1) TFEU as a 
valid legal basis for its establishment.
In the course of the political and academic debate, fuelled mostly by 
the recent ESMA case, one can gain the impression that if the statement 
of overstepping the EU’s Treaty-based competences is repeated enough 
times, it becomes true. Nevertheless, an analysis of the relevant case law 
has proven that the SRB’s establishment and the choice of its legal basis 
can, at least for now, withstand the criticism.
3.3 The second condition of article 114 TFEU – the establishment 
and the functioning of the internal market
First, it is worth clarifying the condition ‘the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market’. According to the Court’s Tobacco Ad-
vertising test,164 a measure should have as its objective the establish-
ment and the functioning of the internal market.165 It is necessary to 
verify whether a measure adopted on the basis of article 114 TFEU ‘actu-
ally contributes to the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of 
goods or to the free movement of services or to removing distortions of 
competition’.166
160 Council of the European Union, ʽ Opinion of the legal serviceʼ ECOFIN 787 1352413, para 
36; for the detailed relationship between BRRD and the SRM Regulation (n 13), see Com-
mission, ʽServices Note: Interaction between SRM and BRRDʼ EUCO 104/2/13 CO EUR 9 
CONCL 6 REV 2 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-297_en.htm> accessed 
19 August 2017.
161 Smoke Flavourings (n 133) paras 47–49.
162 ENISA (n 26) para 45.
163 SRM Regulation (n 13) art 7(4)(a) for direct exercise, SRM Regulation for addressing (n 
13) art 18(9).
164 Case C-376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union ECLI:EU:C:2000:544.
165 ibid, para 84. See, for more, Tamara Perišin, ʽFree Movement of Goods and Limits of 
Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and WTOʼ (Asser Press 2008) 98.
166 Germany v Parliament (n 159) para 95.
245CYELP 13 [2017] 215-253
The Court has consistently held and repeated, eg in the Smoke Fla-
vourings judgment, that article 114(1) TFEU ‘is used as a legal basis only 
where it is actually and objectively apparent from the legal act that its 
purpose is to improve the conditions of the establishment and function-
ing of the internal market.’167 The same reasoning, albeit in more detail, 
was expressed in British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco, Swed-
ish Match and Alliance for Natural Health cases, stating that the measure 
in question has to contribute to the ‘elimination of obstacles to the fun-
damental freedoms or of establishment or to the removal of distortions to 
competition.’168
Therefore, in order for the condition to be met, it is necessary for the 
measure to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods or to remove 
obstacles to the free movement of services or to remove distortions of 
competition. It is important to contextualise this case law in the case of 
the SRB. So, in order for the condition to be met, it is necessary for the 
establishment of the SRB to remove the obstacles to the free movement 
of banking services or to remove distortions of banking competition. More 
precisely, it is relevant to analyse whether the removal of obstacles to the 
resolution of failing banks by creating the SRB has the consequence of 
making the banking system in Europe safer and with fewer obstacles for 
the free movement of banking services.
The mere side effect of improving the conditions of the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market is not enough for the second con-
dition of article 114(1) TFEU to be considered fulfilled.
It is, therefore, also necessary to answer whether the second condi-
tion of article 114 TFEU has been met. More precisely, the following will 
be examined:
- whether the object of centralisation of a resolution mechanism is 
the establishment and the functioning of the internal market; and
- whether the object of setting up an EU agency (ie the SRB) with 
centralised implementing powers is the establishment and the func-
tioning of the internal market.
167 Smoke Flavourings (n 133) para 44; Case C 300/89 Commission of the European Com-
munities v Council of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:1991:244, para 10.
168 Case C 210/03 The Queen, on the application of: Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match 
UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health ECLI:EU:C:2004:80, para 33; Case 154/05 The Queen, 
on the application of Alliance for Natural Health and Nutri-Link Ltd v Secretary of State for 
Health (C-154/04) and The Queen, on the application of National Association of Health Stores 
and Health Food Manufacturers Ltd v Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly for 
Wales (Alliance for Natural Health) ECLI:EU:C:2005:449 para 32; Case 491/01 The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Impe-
rial Tobacco Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2002:741 para 42.
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3.3.1 Is the object of the centralisation of a resolution mechanism the 
establishment and the functioning of the internal market?
As regards the centralisation of a resolution mechanism, it is impor-
tant to point again to the above-mentioned ESMA judgment, in which the 
Court found that the contested article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation 
satisfies (the first and) the second condition of article 114 TFEU.169 The 
relevant points were that its purpose is in particular to ‘ensure a high 
level of consumer and investor protection’ for which it is necessary to 
‘ensure greater coordination and consistency between MSs’, where the 
Court pointed to the cross-border implications of the sector which may 
threaten the ‘orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or 
the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union’.170 
The Court’s reasoning on the subject was based on the text of the 
Recitals to the Short Selling Regulation.171 Despite the numerous pieces 
hailing the ESMA judgment as the saviour-of-the-day when it comes to 
the establishment and powers of the Union agencies,172 it is debatable 
how far it is recommended to use this narrow and context-specific argu-
mentation as a precedent for other situations concerning Treaty bound-
aries of internal market harmonisation.173
On the other hand, a majority of academics acknowledge that cen-
tralised intervention in rules and administrative practices in the finan-
cial sectors of the MSs improves the stability of financial markets which 
consequently improves the conditions for the functioning of the internal 
market.174
Hence, one can argue that the object of the centralisation of a 
resolution mechanism is the establishment and the functioning of 
the internal market, in accordance with article 114 TFEU because the 
169 ESMA (n 37) para 117.
170 ibid, paras 114–15.
171 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 (n 38).
172 See also Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Meroni Circumvented: Article 114 TFEU and EU 
Regulatory Agencies’ (2014) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 64; 
Jacques Pelkmans and Marta Simoncini, ‘Mellowing Meroni: How ESMA Can Help Build 
the Single Market’ (2014) CEPS Commentary.
173 Ferran (n 9) 80.
174 Merijn Chamon made a comment for ESMA, but it applies identically for the relation 
SRB – banks in distress. Merijn Chamon, ʽThe Empowerment of Agencies under the Meroni 
Doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: Comment on United Kingdom v Parliament and Council 
(Short-selling) and the Proposed Single Resolution Mechanismʼ (2014) 3 European Law 
Review 389; Rob van Gestel, ‘European Regulatory Agencies Adrift: Case C-270/12 United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union, Judgment of 22 January 2014, Not Yet Reported’ (2014) Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 188, 192. Dissenting opinions will be discussed 
further in the text.
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banking sector also has cross-border implications which may threaten 
the ‘orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability 
of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union’.
Further analysis from the economic perspective is needed to back 
up the claim that the object of centralisation of a resolution mechanism 
is the establishment and the functioning of the internal market. For 
this analysis from the economic perspective, Eilís Ferran offers what she 
calls ‘reasons of substance’ why article 114 TFEU as the legal basis is 
justifiable.175
First, simply speaking, everything is interconnected. Functioning 
of the single market depends on the functioning of the euro area.176 
Cross-border banking groups are significant in size, so an inconsistent 
approach of MSs in resolution practices increases the resolution costs as 
well as the risk of the spill-over of the crisis and does not help to weaken 
the dependence of the banks on the national budgets and fragments the 
internal market as a whole.177 Since fragmented resolution rules and 
administrative practices negatively affect the MSs not participating in the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) or the SRM as well, establishing 
an EU agency whose target is Eurozone MSs (though the rest may freely 
decide to participate) on the basis of article 114 TFEU is justifiable.178 
After the 2008–2009 crisis, it became evident that the European Banking 
Union (EBU) is indispensable to ensure a more resilient internal market,179 
and it was stressed throughout the process of its creation that in order 
to be effective, it requires both a functional SSM and SRM as its essential 
parts.180 Niamh Moloney suggests that the EBU’s foundational regulatory 
technology is relatively robust, but that there are many uncertainties 
which attend the EBU, notably with respect to operational effectiveness, 
constitutional resilience, and the euro area/internal market asymmetry, 
and which may have far-reaching effects on EU banking market governance 
generally.181
175 Ferran (n 9) 80.
176 ibid, 80.
177 SRM Regulation (n 13) Recitals 9, 10, 12.
178 Regulation (n 13) Recital 12 SRM; Ferran (n 9) 80.
179 Emilios Avgouleas and Douglas W Arner, ʽThe Eurozone Debt Crisis and the European 
Banking Union: A Cautionary Tale of Failure and Reformʼ (2013) Edinburgh Research Ex-
plorer <http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/14512172/Avgouleas_theeurozonedebt-
crisisandtheeuropeanbanki.pdf> accessed 15 March 2017.
180 SRM Regulation (n 13) Recitals 11, 12.
181 Niamh Moloney, ‘European Banking Union: Assessing Its Risks and Resilience’ (2014) 51 
Common Market Law Review 1609, 1609.
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Second, financial markets are extraordinarily sensitive.182 Resolu-
tion authorities must act in a quick and decisive manner when it comes to 
crisis, and ‘a fragmented, cross-border, multiparty, consensus-based de-
cision-making apparatus is inefficient in that situation’.183 Hence, as stat-
ed in Recital 21 to the SRM Regulation, since the rules laid down therein 
can be efficiently applied only when the decision-making responsibility is 
centralised, the SRB is ‘an element of a harmonization process that aims 
at improving the conditions for the functioning of the single market’.184
Third, banks based in an MS which has (or is perceived to have) lower 
ability to rescue ailing banks are at a competitive disadvantage.185 An un-
level playing field as regard resolution rules and practices has an impact 
on the banks’ solvency and perceived credit risk, which in turn has a con-
sequence on borrowing costs for the creditors, dependent on the banks’ 
place of establishment and provision of services.186 Therefore, a situation 
as the one described cannot be labelled as ‘a mere finding of disparities 
between national rules’ or as the ‘abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition’.187 Thus, from 
the competition point of view, there is a reason to base the adoption of the 
SRM (and the SRB as its crucial part) on article 114 TFEU.188
Lastly, some authors argue that there is a difference between the 
internal market and financial stability.189 For instance, the German Min-
ister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble190 claims that ‘(A)rticle 114 aims to 
182 Examples of the two opposite fun facts: Tomi Kilgore, ʽBoeing’s Stock Drops After Trump 
Tweet about Cancelling Air Force One Orderʼ (MarketWatch, 6 December 2016) <http://
www.marketwatch.com/story/boeings-stock-drops-after-trump-tweet-to-cancel-air-force-
one-order-2016-12-06> accessed 29 January 2017; Lindsey Rupp, ʽNordstrom Shares 
Surge After Trump’s Critical Tweetʼ (Bloomberg, 9 February 2017) <https://www.bloomb-
erg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-08/nordstrom-shrugs-off-trump-s-twitter-criticism-as-
shares-climb> accessed 11 February 2017.
183 Ferran (n 9) 81.
184 ibid, 82.
185 Commission, Explanatory Memorandum COM (2013) 530, para 3.1.
186 SRM Regulation (n 13) Recitals 3, 4.
187 Case C 376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union ECLI:EU:C:2000:544, para 84.
188 Ferran (n 9) 81.
189 See Meehea Park, ‘ESMA’s Role as European Supervisory Authority’ (Leiden Law Blog, 
2 February 2014) <http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/esmas-role-as-european-supervisory-
authority> accessed 27 January 2017.
190 The German government had several issues with the creation of the SRM and the SRF 
(some of them the same as the ones discussed in this paper) which were addressed in 
the Council’s confidential legal opinions, but which were later published in the Financial 
Times. See, Alex Barker, ‘Blow to German Banking Union Plan’ Financial Times (London, 
12 September 2013) <www.ft.com/content/ea7c2eb6-1b90-11e3-94a3-00144feab7de> ac-
cessed 3 February 2017; Alex Barker, ‘Setback for Brussels as Lawyers warn on Banking 
Union Plans’ Financial Times (London, 8 October 2013) <www.ft.com/content/306c4e48-
2ffe-11e3-9eec-00144feab7de> accessed 3 February 2017.
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foster the proper functioning of the internal market, which encompasses 
all MSs in geographical terms’.191 ‘Article 114 TFEU does not aim to fos-
ter the specific objective of financial stability for just part of the EU 28, 
namely those MSs participating in the SSM.’192 The issue of the SRB cov-
ering directly only Eurozone states has already been dealt with. In addi-
tion, the legal service of the Council of the European Union in its opinion 
pointed to the mutual dependence of the SSM and the SRM in the pro-
cess of the harmonisation of the internal market for financial services,193 
and, because of that, ‘the fact of being subject to the SSM can therefore 
be regarded as a specific attribute that places the entities falling within 
the scope of application of the [then] proposal in an objectively and char-
acterized distinct position for resolution purposes’.194
As regard financial stability, one must keep in mind the ever-present 
interconnectedness in the sphere of financial markets and economics in 
general. The stability of financial markets is needed for them to function 
smoothly, which, consequently, through price stability and the value of 
the euro, affects the functioning of the internal market as well.195 There-
fore, the authors reiterate their conclusion that the object of centralisa-
tion of a resolution mechanism is the establishment and the functioning 
of the internal market, in accordance with article 114 TFEU. 
3.3.2  Is the object of setting up an EU agency with centralised implementing 
powers the establishment and the functioning of the internal market?
In this subsection, the approach of the Court in the ESMA case will 
be considered, ie close attention will be paid to the Recitals and the pro-
visions of the SRM Regulation in order to analyse whether the object of 
setting up an EU agency with centralised implementing powers (in this 
case, the SRB) is the establishment and the functioning of the internal 
market. One has to look foremost at Recitals 2, 3, 12 and 21 to the SRM 
Regulation.
At the outset, the Union legislator addresses the main reason for set-
ting up an EU agency with centralised implementing powers. It invokes 
market instability and the lack of confidence in the market, which occurs 
because of the divergences between national resolution rules, the dif-
ferent incentives of each MS, and the lack of a unified decision-making 
process in bank resolutions.196 Since these differences ‘have an impact 
191 Schäuble (n 36).
192 ibid (n 36). 
193 Council of the European Union, ʽOpinion of the legal serviceʼ ECOFIN 787 1352413, 
paras 36-39.
194 ibid, para 75.
195 Ferran (n 9) 80.
196 SRM Regulation (n 13) Recitals 2, 3.
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on the perceived credit risk, financial soundness and solvency of their 
[creditors] banks’, freedom of establishment and the free provision of ser-
vices within the internal (financial) market are obstructed.197
Argumentum a contrario, the establishment of an EU agency with 
centralised implementing powers, ie the SRB, would 
ensure a neutral approach in dealing with failing banks and therefore 
increase stability of the banks of the participating Member States 
and prevent the spill-over of crises into non-participating Member 
States and will thus facilitate the functioning of the internal market 
as a whole.198 
Furthermore, Recital 21 expressly sets fair competition and prevent-
ing obstacles to the free exercise of fundamental freedoms as the SRB’s 
objective, and stresses the importance of the centralised application of 
the resolution rules found in the BRRD and the SRM Regulation by a sin-
gle Union resolution authority to ‘avoid divergent interpretations across 
the MSs’.199
The Union legislator makes a strong case against a fragmented bank-
ing market, at the same time advocating not just the unified resolution 
rules but their centralised application as well. According to the Recitals, 
establishment of the SRB as the Union’s single resolution body is indeed 
a measure for which it is actually and objectively apparent that its pur-
pose is to improve the conditions of the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market, ie that it satisfies the second condition of article 
114 TFEU.
In any case, the timeline between the requests and the reasoning 
of the ESMA case, reported in January 2014, and the SRM Regulation, 
adopted in July 2014, is rather symptomatic. When analysing the Recit-
als of the SRM Regulation, it easy to be convinced that the Union legisla-
tor took into account the ESMA case while enacting the SRM regulation 
and establishing the SRB.
It can be concluded that the object of setting up an EU agency with 
centralised implementing powers (ie the SRB) is the establishment and 
the functioning of the internal market.
197 SRM Regulation (n 13) Recital 3.
198 SRM Regulation (n 13) Recital 12.
199 SRM Regulation (n 13) Recital 21.
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3.4 Article 114 TFEU is a valid legal basis for the SRB and the 
transition
It appears that the development of the case law of the Court indicates 
the Court’s readiness to allow a flexible interpretation of the scope of ar-
ticle 114 TFEU, and its pragmatic approach towards the factual creation 
of new structures within the EU which came as a response to changed 
economic (crisis and globalised markets) and political (enlargement of the 
EU overloading the institutions) circumstances. Two paragraphs taken 
from the Opinion of the legal service of the Council of the EU on the pro-
posal of the SRM summarise the interplay between the law and the daily 
decision-making of the institutions.200
First, the Opinion of the legal service recalled the Vodafone judg-
ment in which the Court stated that the legislator ‘is free to complement 
and support a particular harmonization measure with another, based on 
a different conceptual approach - ie, a centralized process of decision – 
when it considers that the first one is not sufficient to achieve the level 
of harmonization desired’.201 Then it stated that article 114 TFEU may 
be the legal basis for the establishment of the SRM as long as there is 
a genuine need for a uniform application of the resolution rules which 
could not be otherwise achieved.202 Though that may sound very much 
like imposing an objective request, the final sentence on the subject con-
cluded that ‘(t)he Union legislator enjoys a margin of discretion to make 
such a determination.’203 Sapienti sat?
On the whole, it should be taken that both the centralisation of a 
resolution mechanism and the setting up of an EU agency with central-
ised implementing powers cumulatively fulfil the two conditions of article 
114(1) TFEU.
For that reason, the answer to the first main question is that article 
114 TFEU was a valid legal basis for the adoption of the SRM Regulation 
by which the EU agency ‘Single Resolution Board’ was established.
Thus, since the answer to the first main question is positive, the 
answer to the second main question is also necessarily positive because, 
if article 114 TFEU was a valid legal basis which was used in accordance 
with the Treaty of Lisbon, it is hard to argue that there is an infraction of 
the principle of conferral or that this dimension of the transition from a 
system of EU vertical federalism to a system of EU horizontal federalism 
has been built on sand.
200 ECOFIN (n 193) para 41; Vodafone (n 155).
201 ECOFIN (n 193) para 41; Vodafone (n 155) para 42.
202 ECOFIN (n 193) para 42.
203 ibid, para 142.
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One line of reasoning which deals with the issue of the validity of 
article 114 TFEU in relation to the switch from vertical federalism to 
horizontal federalism is the one of Andromachi Georgosouli, in which she 
does not deny the harmonising quality of the SRB’s powers, but argues 
that those powers at the same time ‘command to be treated as binding 
substitutes to decisions made at Member State level’, highlighting their 
‘dual dimension’.204 Due to this, she states that ‘measures of this type 
readjust the institutional balance between Member State and EU agen-
cies’205 (which in the wording of this article is considered as a transition 
from vertical to horizontal federalism). Consequently, Georgosouli’s con-
clusion is 
that the conferral of powers that are anchored with the taking of 
such measures requires stronger democratic support than the de-
gree of the democratic support afforded by TFEU Article 114. On this 
view, TFEU Article 352 would have been a more appropriate legal 
basis for the delegation of such a power.206
While dissecting the actions of the EU institutions, one will always 
be able to find what ‘would have been more appropriate’, ‘would have 
been better’, ‘could have been done differently’, or ‘more wisely’. Even 
Georgosouli’s article focuses more on, inter alia, analysing the possible 
risks of legal contestation which a regulatory agency like the SRB may 
encounter and advising on further medium- and long-term reform need-
ed in the operating area of EU agencies than on rebutting the validity of 
article 114 TFEU.
Therefore, only if the conditions of article 114 TFEU were not sat-
isfied could there have been further investigation of and discussion on 
whether the principle of conferral and/or transition from vertical to hori-
zontal federalism were under assault. The MSs, by ratifying the Treaty of 
Lisbon, accepted the possibility that article 114 TFEU would be used for 
the adoption of measures if its conditions were met, thus EU countries 
cannot claim that the EU has acted outside its competences since they 
conferred this competence upon it in the first place. In this instance, 
due to the satisfied conditions of article 114 TFEU, this is an example of 
transition from a system of EU vertical federalism to a system of EU hori-
zontal federalism built on a rock. Theorising on the pathways that could 
have been taken will always be possible, but it is important to separate 
204 Andromachi Georgosouli, ‘Regulatory Incentive Realignment and the EU Legal Frame-
work of Bank Resolution’ (2016) 10(2) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commer-
cial Law 343, 371 <http://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1216
&context=bjcfcl> accessed 10 September 2017.
205 ibid, 377.
206 ibid.
253CYELP 13 [2017] 215-253
that notion from the conclusion that if one engages in it, the original ac-
tion must have been invalid in the first place.
4 Conclusion
The rain came down, the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat 
on the EU agency; and the SRB did not fall, for it was founded on a 
rock.207 One can conclude that the EU acted as a wise builder when it 
built the SRB.
Although, at the start of the research, a great deal of criticism on the 
establishment of the SRB was found, the authors decided not to take the 
SRB’s surrounding controversy at face value, but rather to dissect and 
conclude on their own whether the criticism of the founding of such an 
important EU agency was persuasive or not. 
After all the huffing and puffing, after weighing the pro et contra 
arguments of the Court, the MSs, academia, and the authors’ own argu-
ments, the answer is, in fact, positive. Therefore, no matter how preva-
lent it has been, the criticism is not persuasive. Article 114 TFEU was a 
valid legal basis for the adoption of the SRM Regulation by which the EU 
agency ‘Single Resolution Board’ was established.
Further, this indeed is an example of transition from a system of 
EU vertical federalism to a system of EU horizontal federalism, and one 
which is in accordance with the constitutional framework of the EU. In 
other words, since the conditions of article 114 TFEU needed for its es-
tablishment are fulfilled, the Board as an EU supranational tool for a 
banking market is within the borders of the Treaty of Lisbon. Hence, this 
particular dimension of the transition is founded on a rock.
Argumentative criticism and open discussion are vital for the devel-
opment of democratic societies and for the improvement of MS and EU 
institutions. On the other hand, undeserved and at times exaggerated 
criticism hurts the EU’s cause and hobbles it in reaching its goals by 
spreading mistrust in EU institutions.
207 cf Matthew 7:24–27, Revised Standard Version of the Bible.
